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Three-Branch Monte
Ashutosh Bhagwat*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over ten years ago, in its important opinion in Heckler v. Chaney,' the
Supreme Court declared that when an administrative agency declines to
initiate enforcement proceedings, its decision should be presumptively exempted from the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act 2 (APA) because such decisions are normally "committed to agency discretion by law."8 The Chaney decision, and the important doctrine ofjudicial review that it created, rest on fundamental misunderstandings of the
nature of the administrative state and of the role that separation of powers
principles play within the unitary agencies which constitute most of the
modem state. Because of this misunderstanding, the unintended consequence of Chaney has been to permit administrative agencies to shield policy decisions of great public significance from judicial review by creating a
situation in which agencies are able to hide what are at bottom legislative
and judicial judgments behind the facade of executive discretion: by playing, as it were, a game of three-branch monte. Judicial review, however, is
an essential component of the scheme created by the APA to control and
constrain agency discretion. As a consequence, Chaney has systematically
disturbed the existing balance of authority within the administrative state
by improperly shifting power from reviewing courts to agencies. Some corrective action is therefore required, for both legal and policy reasons.
When the Chaney decision was announced, it represented a major shift
in the Supreme Court's administrative law jurisprudence, which until then
had strongly favored reviewability of agency actions. Nonetheless, the initial response to Chaney in the lower courts was not only widespread acceptance, but indeed some broadening of the Court's actual holding, as the
lower courts attempted to follow what they perceived as the underlying
premises of the decision. Over time, however, these same courts, including
notably the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, have issued a series of opinions sharply limiting the scope of the
Chaney doctrine, and creating broad, seemingly unprincipled exceptions to
its rule of nonreviewability. An examination of these lower court efforts to
reconcile Chaney's presumption of nonreviewability with the existing body
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. BA Yale University 1986; J.D. The University of Chicago 1990. I
would like to thank Marsha Cohen, Bill Dodge, Shannon Gaffney, Evan Lee, Ronald Levin, Alan
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1 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
2 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
3 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
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of administrative law regarding judicial review of agency action and inaction yields important insights into the Court's decision in Chaney. In particular, it suggests that while the Chaney decision rests on some legitimate
pragmatic concerns, the principles adopted in Chaney and the broad gloss
originally placed on that decision by the lower courts-what have together
become the Chaney doctrine-are inconsistent with preexisting law and
with any well-rooted theory of judicial review.
The theoretical difficulties which pervade the Chaney doctrine of
nonreviewability reveal themselves in the opinion itself. The distinctions
upon which the Chaney Court relied in defending its curtailment ofjudicial
review, distinctions between positive "law" and mere enforcement policy,
and between agency action and inaction, are not sustainable in a world
characterized by an almost complete lack of separation of powers within
most administrative agencies, 4 and by pervasive regulation. For similar reasons, the Chaney opinion's reliance on an analogy between agency nonenforcement decisions and traditional executive branch prosecutorial
discretion was also misplaced. The reality is that unitary administrative
agencies, in which legislative, adjudicative, and prosecutorial functions are
combined, are able to make and implement law and policy through a pattern of enforcement and nonenforcement decisions almost as easily as
through more traditional types of agency action, such as rulemaking, which
are universally acknowledged to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, a
legal realist would argue that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between "enforcement" and "law," either from the points of view of an enforcing agency or of those subject to its authority. The main consequence,
then, of a rule against review of enforcement decisions is to encourage
agencies to make law using their enforcement powers rather than other
reviewable avenues such as rulemaking. And the natural reaction of reviewing courts is to seek to limit the ability of agencies to evade judicial
review in that manner. This suggests that the patchwork of decisions that
has emerged in the wake of Chaney should not be understood as the product of unprincipled efforts by lower courts to evade the Chaney doctrine,
but rather as a reflection of the logical inconsistencies of Chaney itself.
None of which is to say that the pragmatic concerns raised in Chaney,
regarding institutional limits on the ability of the courts to review agency
nonenforcement and resource allocation decisions, are without force.
Clearly, universal and searching review of nonenforcement decisions, on
the model ofjudicial review of agency rulemaking, for example, is neither
plausible nor desirable. What is needed is a more modulated approach to
review of enforcement policy and nonenforcement decisions, under which
courts acknowledge the primacy of agencies as to some aspects of enforcement policy formulation, but do not wholly forsake judicial supervision of
an entire area of agency policymaking, as does the Chaney doctrine. Such a
modulated approach, under which agencies would be required to articulate, defend, and follow consistent enforcement (and nonenforcement)
4 For a discussion of the lack of separation of powers within agencies, and some of its problematic implications, see John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure andJudicialDeference to Agency
Interpretationsof Agency Rues, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 631-34, 654-60 (1996).
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policies but would be given substantial freedom in formulating the inherently discretionary parts of those policies, would be far more sustainable
and more consistent with longstanding principles of judicial review than
the categorical approach of Chaney.
II.

CHAMYAND

ITS PROGENY

Heckler v. Chaney stands as one of the modem landmarks of administrative law. It has been the topic of any number of articles describing, discussing, and criticizing its doctrinal analysis. 5 Though I will refrain from
covering old ground, a brief discussion of the decision is necessary as background for the events that later unfolded in the lower appellate courts.
The underlying claim in Chaney was extremely unusual, given the doctrinal
significance of the case. A group of death row inmates filed a petition with
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), asking the agency to investigate
and regulate the use of certain drugs in lethal injections by the States
which had sentenced the inmates to death. The Commissioner of the FDA
denied the petition, explaining that he was not pursuing the requested investigation in part because he was uncertain of the agency's jurisdiction,
and in part because even ifjurisdiction existed, he did not think it a productive use of the agency's resources to pursue such an investigation in
light of the "lack of a serious danger to the public health," and the legal
uncertainty regarding whether the states' use of the drugs violated the substantive provisions of the Food and Drug Act.6 The inmates then filed an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking review under the APA of the Commissioner's decision denying their
petition. The DistrictJudge granted summary judgment for the agency on
the grounds that the Commissioner's decision declining to undertake an
enforcement action was unreviewable under the APA. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the APA did not preclude review of the
Commissioner's decision, and that his refusal to commence an investigation was arbitrary and capricious. 7 Finally the Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist,8 in turn reversed the
D.C. Circuit.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis rested primarily on § 701 (a) (2) of the
APA, which exempts from the general right ofjudicial review established in
5

See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, No Law to Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. Rxv. 1 (1988); Ronald M.

Levin, UnderstandingUnreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Ci. L. REv. 653 (1985); The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term, LeadingCases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 264 (1985 Part III); Donald M. Levy
& DeloraJean Duncan, NoteJudiciaReview of AdministrativeRulemaking and Enforcement Discretion:
The Effect of a Presumptionof Unreviewability, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1987); Sharon Werner,
Note, The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney onJudicialReviewofAgency Decisions,86 COLUM. L. REv. 1247

(1986).
6 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824-25.
7 Id. at 825-27 (citing Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd 470 U.S. 821
(1985)). Then-Judge Scalia dissented from the panel's opinion.

8 justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by every member of the Court exceptJustice Marshall, who filed an opinion concurring in thejudgment. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 840-55. Justice Brennan also filed a concurring opinion, though he joined the opinion of the Court. IL- at 838-39.
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§ 702 and § 706 of the APA any agency action which "is committed to
agency discretion by law." 9 Relying on precedent, 10 the Court first established that this exception only applies "in those rare instances where [the
relevant statute governing the agency's actions is] drawn in such broad
terms that ...there is no law to apply.""' The Court departed from precedent, however, when it concluded that agency nonenforcement decisions,
such as the FDA Commissioner's decision at issue in the case, should be
presumptively exempt under § 701 (a) (2) from the APA'sjudicial review provisions, because of the practical difficulties which would arise if the judiciary sought to review and supervise an agency's decisions as to which
violations of law to pursue and which to ignore. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized several factors. First, it noted that nonenforcement decisions involve a complex balancing of discretionary factors,
including especially how an agency's resources are best allocated, which
courts are ill-suited to second-guess. Second, the Court noted that nonenforcement decisions do not involve the use of an agency's "coercive powers
over an individual's liberty or property rights,"12 and so are presumably less
in need of judicial control than decisions to take positive action. And finally, the Court commented on the similarities between agency nonenforcement decisions and the criminal prosecutorial discretion traditionally
enjoyed by the Executive Branch. Despite this analogy, however, the Court
emphasized that its decision was not dictated by the Constitution, and that
the presumption of nonreviewability it was creating could be rebutted
under a number of circumstances. Most significantly, the Court pointed
out that review would be available when Congress had established statutory
13
guidelines for how an agency should exercise its enforcement authority.
It also recognized at least the possibility that review would be available in
other circumstances, including when an agency's own regulations set out
enforcement guidelines, 14 when an agency refuses to act solely because it
believes it lacks jurisdiction, and when an agency has adopted an extreme
policy of nonenforcement amounting to "an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities."'15
Despite all of these hedges, Chaney represents a substantial departure
from the Court's previous decisions regarding judicial review under the
APA. Prior to Chaney, and beginning with the landmark case of Abbott Labo6 the Court had long recognized
ratoriesv. Gardner,1
a presumption in favor
of the reviewability of agency actions. Moreover, this presumption encompassed agency failures to act, since under the APA agency action is defined
to include a "failure to act," so that action and inaction are not treated
9 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2).
10 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
11 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410).
12 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
13 Id. at 833. Congressional authority to override the nonreview presumption would, of
course, not exist if the Chaney holding had been based on constitutional principles.
14 Id. at 836.
15 Id. at 833 n.4.
16 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see also Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2231 (1995).
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differently for purposes of reviewability. 17 As a result, the Court had interpreted the APA's exceptions to its judicial review provisions very narrowly.
In Chaney, however, the Court created a presumption against judicial review for an entire category of agency actions, based largely on pragmatic
rather than statutory factors. As such, the Chaney opinion represented an
important innovation in the Court's administrative law jurisprudence, and
produced a significant shift in the existing balance between agencies and
reviewing courts. Certainly Chaney was originally so received by the lower
courts. The decision has been invoked in a very large number of administrative law cases to deny review of agency action, including a long line of
decisions in the D.C. Circuit; 18 it has been described as the Court's "worst
departure" from the longstanding tradition of reviewability of administrative action;' 9 and it provided the initial impetus for the formulation of a
broad, though ultimately abortive, new exception to the general presump20
tion in favor of judicial review for issues of agency resource allocation.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit seems from the start to have extended Chaney's
presumption of nonreviewability from individual nonenforcement decisions to agency announcements of a general enforcement policy.2 1 This was
not an inevitable step-while there is no clear line between individual decisions and policies, 22 there is a common sense distinction which the D.C.
Circuit might have invoked between broadly worded policies with which
the public at large is likely to be concerned, and fact-bound individual decisions, relevant primarily to a particular set of parties.
Nonetheless, despite this early enthusiasm, the reception of the Chaney
doctrine in the lower courts has cooled. In recent years, instead of picking
up on the expansive tone of the Court's opinion, lower courts have tended
to restrict Chaney to its narrow holding regarding review of agency nonenforcement decisions, and even within that sphere, have sought to carve out
a number of exceptions to the general nonreviewability presumption. The
remainder of this section describes these limitations on the scope of
Chaney.
17 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994); Levy & Duncan, supra note 5, at 624-25; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1994) (permitting reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld"); 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (authorizing review if agency officer "failed to act").
18 See, e.g., New York State Dept. of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1214-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Coker v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 84, 88-90 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Safe Energy Coalition v. NRC, 866 F.2d
1473, 1476-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1989);
Arnow v. NRC, 868 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1989); Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. NRC,
852 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988); Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1986); Schering Corp. v.
Heckler, 779 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Levin, supra note 5, at 753 n.321 (listing cases); cf NLRB
v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 130 (1987) (finding informal settlement by NLRB General Counsel unreviewable because it is "prosecution," not "adjudication").
19 Davis, supra note 5, at 7; see also id. at 2.
20 See California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally Levy &
Duncan, supranote 5, at 615-17; Werner, supra note 5, at 1257-58 (criticizing such a broad reading of Chaney). As the following discussion indicates, no such broad reading of Chaney appears to
have in fact taken hold.
21 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Homer, 854 F.2d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22 See generally infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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The first notable aspect of the evolution of the Chaney doctrine is the
enormous resistance that the lower courts have displayed to expanding
Chaney much beyond its original holding. Chaney has been received as a
decision about review of agency nonenforcement decisions, not about the
role of the courts in controlling agency discretion, or even about review of
agency inaction. For example, soon after Chaney, the D.C. Circuit was
presented with the question of what effect the Court's decision had on the
lower court's pre-Chaney precedent permitting judicial review of an agency
decision not to promulgate regulations.2 3 In an opinion by Judge Williams,
the court held that despite the facial similarities between agency decisions
not to enforce and agency decisions not to. promulgate rules, Chaney
should not be extended to nonpromulgation decisions.2 4 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that nonpromulgation is not analogous to
criminal prosecutorial decisions in that it tends to be based on legal rather
than factual considerations, and further noted that because § 555 (e) of the
APA requires agencies to give reasons for denying petitions to initiate
rulemaking, nonpromulgation decisions are therefore amenable to judicial
review (albeit generally under a very deferential standard). However, the
grounds upon which the court distinguished Chaney are very weak, since
most ofJudge Williams's arguments in favor of reviewing nonpromulgation
seem to apply equally to nonenforcement. 25 Moreover, nonpromulgation
is just one, though perhaps the most significant, example of the resistance
of courts to extend Chaney. For example, courts have tended to reject efforts to extend the Chaney nonreviewability presumption to categories of
agency actions, such as personnel decisions, where pragmatic concerns similar to those relied upon by the Court in Chaney are raised.2 6 In addition,
Ronald Levin has catalogued instances in which the courts have faced types
23 The key existing precedent was WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
24 American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (AHPA); see also
National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96-97 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Farmworkers Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 635-37 (D.C. Cir.) (Williams, J.,
dissenting), vacated as moot 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987); ef. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782
F.2d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (suggesting in dictum that nonpromulgation is unreviewable under Chaney).
25 Levin, supra note 5, at 764-67. First, the explanation requirement of § 555(e) applies
equally to nonpromulgation and nonenforcement decisions. In addition, it is far from clear that
nonpromulgation decisions are generally more "legal" than nonenforcement decisions-and in
any event it is not clear why this reasoning supports a categorical rule of review or nonreview,
since one could as easily limit review to situations where an agency gives legal reasons for a nonpromulgation decision (or for that matter, a nonenforcement decision). Finally, it is not clear
why deferential review is more plausible for nonpromulgation than for nonenforcement. The
AHPA decision is thus probably best understood as evidencing the general resistance of the D.C.
Circuit, and the lower courts in general, to the underlying themes of the Chaney decision. Indeed, as discussed below in detail, all of the reasons given by Judge Williams for reviewing nonpromulgation decisions seem to apply with equal strength to at least some types of
nonenforcement decisions. See infra Part II.
26 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Homer, 854 F.2d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
see also Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1403-04 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting
application of Chaney to Army Board for Correction of Military Records's decision refusing to
waive a limitations period); Cardozo v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1547-51 (7th Cir. 1985) (declining
to extend Chaney to decision by CFTC declining to review disciplinary action conducted by Chicago Board of Trade). These and similar decisions seem to represent a clear rejection of the
early movement towards extending Chaney to all agency decisions involving resource allocation.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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of agency decisions parallel to, but distinguishable from, the archetypal
nonenforcement decision at issue in Chancy, and noted a general refusal of
courts to extend Chaney's presumption of nonreviewability to those situations.2 7 In toto, these decisions have tended to cabin the effects of Chancy to
the precise and narrow category of agency nonenforcement decisions actually considered by the Supreme Court.
In addition to limiting the reach of Chancy, courts have created or
relied upon a number of exceptions to the general nonreviewability
rule, to again limit the inroads of the Chancy doctrine on the general presumption of judicial review. To begin with, all of the possible exceptions
recognized in the original Chancy opinion have been relied upon and
even expanded. Statutes have thus been found to provide sufficient
standards to rebut the Chancy presumption and permit review.2 8 Picking
up on a hint in the Chancy opinion, 29 the lower courts have also widely
recognized that the Chancy presumption may be rebutted by agency regulations which purport to guide the agency's exercise of its enforcement
discretion.3 0 Finally, the narrower exceptions for situations when an
agency abdicates its enforcement responsibilities, 3 1 and when it declines
27 Thus, when an agency conducts a proceeding to determine whether to pursue a particular
violation, and then decides to do nothing, courts have reviewed the final agency order-even
though in form the order is nothing more than a decision not to enforce. See Levin, supranote 5,
at 769-70 & n.406 (citing cases). The underlying principle of these cases, that so-called "negative
orders" are reviewable in the same way as agency orders taking positive legal action, has been
well-established since Justice Frankfurter's pathbreaking opinion in Rochester Tel. Cop. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125 (1943); so it is unsurprising that Chaney did not alter this result. However, this
distinction-between nonenforcement and negative orders-is obviously a difficult one to maintain. See New York State Dept. of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1214-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (court
applies Chaney to preclude review of an agency decision to settle an enforcement action, while
acknowledging that a decision declining to invalidate a tariff following a full investigation would
be reviewable). Courts have also continued after Chaney to review claims that an agency has
unreasonably delayed action in an ongoing proceeding, again despite the obvious facial similarity
to a nonenforcement decision. Levin, supra note 5, at 770-73. Finally, courts have struggled with,
and have occasionally continued to review, decisions to dismiss ongoing enforcement proceedings before completion. Id. at 773-75 (arguing that "no consistentjudicial response" has emerged
to such cases); see id. at 774 n.436 (citing cases granting review). But see NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Cuyohoga Valley Railway v. United Transp. Union,
474 U.S. 3 (1985) (per curiam); New York State Dep't of Law, 984 F.2d at 1214-17; Schering
Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (all denying review).
28 See, e.g., Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368,
1372-74 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (both following Supreme Court decision in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560 (1975)-which was distinguished in Chany---and reviewing Secretary of Labor's refusal to
sue to set aside union elections under Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act); Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v.FEC, 831 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
29 Chany, 470 U.S. at 836.
30 See Clifford v. Pefia, 77 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Arnow v. United States Nuclear
Regulation Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1989); Safe Energy Coalition v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 866 F.2d 1473, 1476-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. United States Nuclear Research Comm'n, 852 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988); Center for
Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 803-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on othergrounds on reh'g846 F.2d
1532 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (on rehearing, court reaffirmed that agency regulations
could rebut Chaney presumption, but found presumption not rebutted by NHTSA regulations at
issue); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafiess v. Baldridge, 827 F.2d 1353, 1360-62 (9th Cir.
1987).
31 See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 782
F.2d 730, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1986). This exception has its origin in the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (reviewing

HEW failure to enforce Title VI).
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to act due to a belief that the agency lacks jurisdiction,3 2 have also been
invoked to permit review.
The courts have not stopped, however, with the exceptions identified
in Chaney. Using the "lack ofjurisdiction" exception as purported authorization, several courts announced soon after Chaney was decided that the
presumption of nonreviewability would not prevent a court from reviewing
a statutory interpretation, or other "legal" conclusion, announced by the
agency in the course of a nonenforcement decision; and that therefore
courts would be able to review nonenforcement decisions when the sole
reason for the agency's failure to act was a legal interpretation. The evolution and possible demise of this exception are of particular significance
both in illustrating how the lower courts have struggled to confine Chaney,
and in exposing the underlying weaknesses of the Chaney doctrine.
In the leading case, InternationalUnion, UAW v. Brock,33 the D.C. Circuit (by Judge Wald) held unreviewable, on Chaney grounds, a decision of
the Secretary of Labor declining to enforce the reporting requirements of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), but
nonetheless did review a part of the agency's accompanying opinion which
interpreted the underlying statute as not applying to the challenged conduct. In granting this partial review the court relied upon the purported
difference between an agency decision not to exercise its enforcement discretion against a particular violation, and an agency decision setting out
the legal obligations imposed on the public by a statute; and it emphasized
that failing to review the latter would create an enormous loophole in the
ability of courts to review statutory interpretations announced by agencies. 34 The "legal issue" exception announced in InternationalUnion has
been relied upon to permit review in at least two subsequent D.C. Circuit
decisions. First, in National Wildlife Federation v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 35 the court reviewed and set aside an EPA regulation

which interpreted the Safe Drinking Water Act to permit the EPA to decline to withdraw a state's "primacy" (authority to enforce the Act), even
after the agency determined that the state no longer met statutory requirements. Then, in Edison Electric Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 36 the court reviewed an EPA Enforcement Policy Statement in

which the agency reaffirmed its position that certain waste storage practices
violated the substantive provisions of the Resources Conservation Recovery
Act (RCRA), but also stated that the agency considered such storage a low
enforcement priority. A number of other courts have also indicated support for a "legal issue" exception, or some variant of it, to the Chancy
doctrine.3 7
32

See, e.g., Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 898 F.2d 753 (9th

Cir. 1990).
33 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986), overued by Crowley Caribbean Transp. v. Pefia, 37 F.3d 671
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
34 International Union, 783 F.2d at 246.
35 980 F.2d 765, 772-74 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
36 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
37 See, e.g., Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 898 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1990); Board of Trade v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 883 F.2d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.); cf. Farmworkers Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 619-23 (D.C. Cir.
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Recently, however, the continued viability of a broad "legal issues" exception has been called into doubt, at least in the all-important D.C. Circuit. In Crowley CaribbeanTransportation,Inc. v. Pefia,38 that court was faced
with a claim that it should review an individual nonenforcement decision
by the Maritime Administrator, because the decision was based on the legal
conclusion that the challenged conduct did not violate the underlying statute.3 9 Recognizing that InternationalUnion would permit review in this situation, the court (in an opinion by Judge Williams) undertook a review of
the law in the area, and concluded that the "legal issues" exception, when
applied to permit review of an individual nonenforcement decision, was
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. The court noted in particular
that subsequent to Chaney the Supreme Court had apparently forbidden
reviewing courts from "carving out" reviewable issues from unreviewable
agency actions.40 The court distinguished the Edison Electric Institute and
National Wildlife Federation cases on the grounds that they involved legal
challenges to "an agency's statement of a general enforcement policy... [rather than] an agency's decision to decline enforcement in the
context of an individual case." 4 1 Thus in Crowley the D.C. Circuit appears
to have narrowed the exception to Chaney opened in InternationalUnion, to
encompass legal challenges to general enforcement policies only. An examination of the reasons for this rejection of what had been identified as a
potentially promising means to limit the dangerous consequences of the
Chaney doctrine,4 2 as well as of the problems with the solution adopted by
Judge Williams in Crowley, must, however, wait until I have discussed one
more significant line of cases in which lower courts have circumvented the
principles announced in Chaney.
This particular story begins with the D.C. Circuit's 1987 decision in
Community Nutrition Institute v. Younge 3 (CM). The court was faced with
the question whether the Notice and Comment requirements for informal
rulemaking under the APA 44 applied to the adoption of FDA "Action
Levels," which are numerical standards published by the FDA (without No1987), vacated as moot 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (actions committed to agency discretion still
reviewable for statutory violations); Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas, 792
F.2d 782, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Dole, 760 F.2d 1021,
1025 (9th Cir. 1985) (SchroederJ., dissenting) (same). See generallyLevin, supranote 5, at 777 &
n.446 (listing cases permitting review of particular claims in face of Chancy presumption); id. at
746-50 (arguing in favor of a rule of "partial unreviewability," permitting review of legal challenges, but not discretionary decisions); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 658-59, 676-77 (suggesting that
reviewability after Chancy must depend on the nature of the challenge to the agency decision, and
the reasons for the agency's inaction).
38 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
39 The challenge to the agency action was brought by a competitor of the regulated entity
seeking a waiver. The competitor sought to challenge the agency's conclusion, announced in the
course of denying the requested waiver, that there was no statutory violation.
40 Crowey, 37 F.3d at 676 (citing Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282-83 (1987).
41 Crowhey, 37 F.3d at 676. The court did note, however, that a general enforcement policy
might be articulated in the course of announcing an individual nonenforcement decision, in
which case such an agency statement might be reviewable. Id. at 677. This concession has significant implications, which will be discussed infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 5, at 746-50; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 658-59, 676-77.
43 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
44 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
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tice and Comment) to inform food producers of what the agency considers
to be allowable levels of contamination in food.45 The FDA argued that the
Action Levels fell within the APA exception for "'interpretative rules [and]
general statements of policy,"' because action levels were merely "nonbinding statements of agency enforcement policy," 46 and therefore were not
"legislative rules" subject to Notice and Comment.4 7 Describing the distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements as "enshrouded in considerable smog," the court concluded that the
primary criteria for distinguishing non-legislative rules are that they must
"not have a present effect," and must "genuinely leave[ ] the agency and its
decisionmakers free to exercise discretion." 48 The court then applied
these criteria to the FDA's Action Levels, and rejected the agency's argument that Action Levels should be exempt from Notice and Comment requirements. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the
mandatory language employed by the FDA in describing Action Levels.
More interestingly, however, the court also relied on the fact that Action
Levels, though concededly not "binding" on regulated firms (in the sense
that the FDA could not rely on Action Levels to prove a violation of law in
court), acted as legislative rules because they effectively constrainedthe discretion and ability of the agency to prosecute contamination levels below
the published Action Level, the reasoning being that the agency would find
it almost impossible to convince a court that such a level of contamination
made food "adulterated" under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 49
Therefore, the court held that the Action Levels, even though described by
the agency as enforcement guidelines, were subject to the Notice and Comment requirements of the APA, and remanded for the agency to follow
these procedures. 5 0
The issues resolved in the CMI case did not directly implicate Chaney,
because the CNI court did not rule that the FDA's enforcement guidelines
were subject to substantive judicial review under the APA, but rather held
that the agency could not issue them without going through Notice and
Comment procedures. 51 And it is quite clear that the availability of sub45 The Action Level at issue in CAr!involved permissible levels of aflatoxins in corn.
46 Community Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 945-46 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3)(A) (1994)).
47 See Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1995); Hoctor v. USDA,
82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.).
48 Community Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 946 (quoting American Bus Ass'n v. United States,
627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
49 Ld.
at 948 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1994)).
50 The actual history, and eventual disposition, of the CANF litigation was even more convoluted than this description suggests. When the aflatoxin Action Level was originally appealed to
the D.C. Circuit, the court had set it aside on the grounds that the FDA could not proceed
through informal Action Levels, but rather had been required by Congress to issue formal rules,
called tolerances. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court reversed, on Chevron grounds. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S.
974 (1986). The decision discussed in the text was issued on remand. Ultimately, however, the
FDA avoided the cumbersome Notice and Comment procedures required by the D.C. Circuit, by

simply announcing that its Action Levels were not binding on anyone, including the agency. For
a full discussion of the history of this litigation, see Richard M. Thomas, ProsecutorialDiscretion
and
Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance,44 ADMIN. L. Rav. 131, 144-54 (1992).
51 Thus the CAT court did not even cite Chancy in resolving the Notice and Comment issue,
though it did invoke Chancy in a separate portion of its opinion, in which the court declined to
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stantivejudicial review is an issue distinct from an agency's procedural obligations. 52 Nonetheless, Richard Thomas has pointed out that the result in
CNI in a very real sense evades the broader policy of Chaney. By placing
Chaney in the context of the recent Supreme Court efforts to limit judicial
control over administrative agencies, Thomas shows that one possible understanding of Chaney is that agencies should be able to allocate their enforcement resources and formulate enforcement policy autonomously,
without having to answer to the courts. 53 The CMY doctrine clearly interferes with that ability, by bringing the courts into the process of setting
guidelines. And the continued lack of substantive judicial review after GN!
may not alleviate these concerns because, as Thomas points out, the proceduralreview necessary to determine whether an agency really has complied
with Notice and Comment requirements can easily fade into substantive
review.54 Moreover, the evolution of the so-called CNI doctrine tends to
confirm Thomas's fears. CNhas been invoked in a number of cases to set
aside on procedural grounds what could be characterized as agency enforcement policies. 5 5 And later cases have tended to expand the reach of
56
the CAT doctrine. Most notably, in McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas,
Judge Williams reexamined the APA's legislative rule versus policy statement distinction and concluded that in addition to mandatory language, a
key determinant of whether a rule is legislative is whether the agency in
practice applies the rule inflexibly, and treats it as binding on itself.5 7 CU
and its progeny thus quite clearly narrow the "nonlegislative rules" exemption from Notice and Comment requirements. 5 8 Of course, CM- does not
review the FDA's granting of exemptions to its Action Levels. Community Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d
at 945-50.
52 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024 (1993) (distinguishing substantive review from Notice
and Comment requirements).
53 Thomas, supra note 50, at 132-44.
54 Thomas relates this phenomenon to the general use of "hard look" review in APA
rulemaking cases, under which a reviewing court, in deciding if an adopted rule is "arbitrary and
capricious" under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994), determines if the agency has meaningfully responded to all public comments, and has given a reasoned explanation for its decision. See
Thomas, supra note 50, at 151 & nn.121, 122. For examples of "hard look" review, see Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1988); Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For some academic criticisms of such review, seeJEuY L
MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); Levin, supra note 5, at 690
n.2; Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the RulemakingProcess,41 DuKE LJ. 1385,
1412 (1992); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarityon the District of Columbia Circuit andJudicialDeterrence of Agency Rulemaking 1988 DUKE LJ. 300; Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1051, 1067-68 & n.65 (1995).
55 See, e.g., Alaska v. USDOT, 868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC,
28 F.8d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Alaska decision is particularly noteworthy because the author
of that opinion, Judge Starr, dissented from the original CAr opinion, indicating the degree to
which the doctrine of that case has gained acceptance in the D.C. Circuit.
56 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
57 Id. at 1321-22. This focus on actual agency behavior seems to have become an established
part of the law in this area. See, e.g., United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
58 For an example of a previous, more permissive view, see Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale
Oil Co., 796 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.). For a complete and incisive discussion of the
misuse by agencies of nonlegislative rules, see Robert Anthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements,
Guidances,Manuals, and the Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public.', 41 DUKE LJ.
1311 (1992); see also Michael Asimow, NonlegislativeRulemaking and Regulatoy Reform, 1985 DuKE
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formally impose substantive judicial review on any agency actions; and its
effect is largely limited to agencies' statements of enforcement policy, as
opposed to individual enforcement decisions, because broadly worded policies are far more likely to establish generally applicable principles, and so
constitute rules subject to Notice and Comment, than a decision not to
pursue an individual violation. 59 Furthermore, not all circuits have followed the CN~approach. 60 Nonetheless, given the significance of the D.C.
Circuit in administrative law, CN! certainly represents a significant collateral attack on the effectiveness of the Chaney doctrine.
III.

CONFUSION IN THE

RANKs:

THE FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CONFINE

THE CHAAEY DOCTRINE

Why this concerted resistance in the lower courts to a broad implementation of Chan'y? One possible explanation is simply the judiciary defending its turf: Chaney represents an effort by the Supreme Court to
restrict the power of the Courts of Appeals, which those courts not surprisingly resist. This theory seems incomplete, however, especially given the
near unanimity of the lower courts' reception of Chaney.6 1 A more plausible explanation for these efforts to cut back on Chaney is that they reflect
the difficulties courts have faced in trying to reconcile that decision with
the well-established existing law governing judicial review of agency action,
difficulties rooted in underlying weaknesses in the Chaney doctrine itself.
Those weaknesses are well illustrated by another story, involving the efforts
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to impose its detariffing policy on the long distance telecommunications industry.
In 1979, prior to the break-up of the Bell System, the FCC was faced
with a difficult regulatory problem, in which an increasingly competitive
long distance market was emerging in the shadow of a regulatory structure
which was designed on the assumption of monopoly power on the part of
LJ. 881 (arguing against imposition of Notice and Comment requirements on nonlegislative
rules).
59 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994); supra note 22 and accompanying text. Of course, it is always
possible that an agency will announce a general policy in the course of an individual nonenforcement decision, such as occurred in New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 11-14
(2d Cir. 1995) (NYCER), in which case difficult questions of categorization are raised. Note that
the distinction between enforcement policy and individual nonenforcement decisions was also
relied upon by Judge Williams in Crowley, to limit the scope of the "legal issues" exception to
Chaney. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
60 Thus in NYCER, 45 F.Sd at 12, the Second Circuit held that an SEC no-action letter, in
which the SEC announced a "new interpretation" of a long-standing rule regarding corporate
obligations to include shareholder proposals in proxy materials, was not subject to Notice and
Comment requirements because the SEC statement was merely an "interpretive rule." The court
relied heavily on the fact that a no-action letter "binds no one." Id. at 12. Under the pragmatic
approach to the "binding" character of agency statements announced in CWI and McLouth, however, one suspects the case would be decided differently. It should be noted that SEC no-action
letters have been held to be substantively unreviewable under Chaney. See, e.g., Board of Trade of
City of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1989).
61 In this context, it is noteworthy that Judge Bork was on the original panel that decided
International Union v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (creating the "legal issues" exception
to Chaney); and Judge Williams authored the opinion declining to extend Chaney to nonpromulgation of rules. Neither is known as a particular supporter of broad-ranging judicial authority.
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the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).62 The FCC
believed that this structure, including in particular its burdensome tariffing
requirements, 63 was inhibiting the emerging competition, and it responded with a permissive detariffing policy, by which it would forebear
from enforcing tariff-filing requirements against all "nondominant carriers" (i.e., everyone in the long-distance industry except AT&T).64 No one
challenged this action. In 1985, however, the FCC adopted a mandatory
detariffing policy which forbadesuch carriers from filing tariffs. 65 MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI), one nondominant carrier, challenged this
policy in the D.C. Circuit, which found the FCC policy to violate § 203 of
the Communications Act.66 The court did not consider the validity of the
prior permissive detariffing policy, even though the court's reasoning in
striking down mandatory detariffing seemed to apply equally to permissive
detariffing, primarily because the FCC had justified its permissive detariffing policy as an exercise of its enforcement discretion, and therefore it was
arguably immune from review under Chaney.6 7 For the next four years,
therefore, the permissive detariffing regime remained in place, under
which AT&T alone among long distance carriers was required to file rate
tariffs for all of its services. In 1989, AT&T decided to challenge the legality
of permissive detariffing. A direct attack of the FCC's policy, however, was
not possible, in part because the time had long past for direct review of the
1983 Fourth Report and Order, and in part because of the FCC's invocation of Chaney.6 8 AT&T therefore filed a complaint before the FCC under
§ 208 of the Communications Act 69 against MCI, seeking damages and a
cease and desist order on the theory that since 1987 MCI had been violating § 203 of the Communications Act by providing services at negotiated
rates which were not contained in filed tariffs, and therefore caused competitive injury to AT&T, both because when competing for new business,
MCI was aware of AT&T's prices but not vice versa, and because the regulatory process itself could be manipulated to hinder AT&T's provision of
services. The FCC's original response was to avoid resolving AT&T's complaint. But after AT&T petitioned for a writ of mandamus before the D.C.
Circuit, the FCC resolved the complaint by dismissing it on procedural
grounds, purportedly without resolving the underlying issue of whether
MCI had violated the Communications Act. AT&T appealed, and the D.C.
Circuit reversed. 70 The court began by rejecting the procedural grounds
62 See generally Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (1994).
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
64 See In rePolicy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Thereof, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983) (Fourth Report and Order).
65 See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985) (Sixth Report and Order).
66 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
67 See id. at 1190-91 n.4; see also AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
68 It should be remembered that at this time, prior to its decisions in Edison Electric Institute
and Crowley, the D.C. Circuit understood the Chaney doctrine to apply to enforcement policies.
See supranotes 21-22 and accompanying text.
69 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1994) (as amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.CA.
§ 208 (West Supp. 1996)).
70 See AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1992). For a description of the events
leading up to this appeal, see id. at 730-31.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

invoked by the FCC, describing them as an "administrative law shell
game."7 1 Reaching the merits, the court then noted that the FCC, after a
decade of wavering, was no longer claiming that its permissive detariffing
policy was a mere enforcement policy, but rather had conceded that it constituted a substantive rule defining the rights and obligations of regulated
carriers. 7 2 Once it had gotten over the Chaney hurdle to reviewability, the
court quickly concluded that the permissive detariffing policy clearly violated § 203 of the Communications Act, as interpreted in its 1985
decision. 73
The FCC's ability for an entire decade to invoke Chaney to avoid judicial review of a policy that the agency must have known would be found
illegal by the courts is extremely troubling. But what is more troubling is
the difficulty the courts had in determining whether permissive detariffing
even qualified as an enforcement policy immune from review under Chaney,
or whether it was, as everyone ultimately agreed it was, a run-of-the-mill
legislative rule fully reviewable under the APA. The FCC was of course able
to take advantage of the courts' uncertainty to prolong its avoidance of
judicial scrutiny, while at the same time never having to accept the consequences of stating definitively that permissive detariffing was merely an enforcement policy. The agency's equivocations were only ended because of
the happenstance that the Communications Act contained a private right
of action for damages, which AT&T was able to invoke. 74 That reviewability
should turn on such thin reeds seems absurd.75 It is also indicative of the
arbitrariness of the line drawn by Chaney to distinguish reviewable from
unreviewable actions, because the practical consequences of the FCC's
"permissive detariffing" policy-for the public, for regulated carriers, and
for the agency-were precisely the same whether the policy was characterized as "enforcement guidelines" or as a substantive rule. The agency was
able to make and implement policy with equal ease through either vehicle.
71 Id. at 731-32.
72 Id. at 735. The FCC of course had to take this position, in order to argue even plausibly
that MCI's conduct was immune from a private challenge brought under the Communications
Act.
73 Id. at 735-36. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Communications Act, and its conclusion that permissive detariffing violated the Act, were confirmed by the Supreme Court in MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994). In § 401 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 401, 110 Stat. 56, 128-29 (1996), however, Congress appears to have
granted the FCC explicit forbearance authority, effectively overruling the holding of MCI v.
AT&T. Finally, in the interest of full disclosure, I should mention that while I was not involved in
any of the litigation described in this article, I did in a prior incarnation participate in some of
the aftermath of the AT&T v. FCC litigation, on behalf of AT&T.
74 It should be noted that § 208, the Communications Act's private right of action, seems to
be designed not for the benefit of regulated entities such as AT&T, but rather for aggrieved
customers of regulated carriers, the theoretical statutory beneficiaries. The language of the provision, however, is broad enough to encompass AT&T's claim.
75 It could be argued that Congress's failure to include a private cause of action in a regulatory statute evinces an intent to shield certain types of policies from judicial review-but this is
most implausible. The policy considerations governing whether to subject regulated entities to
private suits for damages are quite different from the considerations relevant to whether the
regulating agency's policies should be entirely immune from judicial review. See generalyRichard
B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, PublicPrograms and Private Rights, 95 HaRv. L R-v. 1193 (1982)
(discussing relationship between private right to initiate administrative enforcement and private
right of action against regulated entities).

1996]

THREE-BRANCH MONTE

Indeed, these two purportedly distinct types of agency statements are in
practical terms so similar that the FCC was able to plausibly characterize a
single written document as either a rule or an enforcement policy, depending on expediency. Yet that characterization was decisive in determining
the availability of substantive judicial review. Such an arbitrary rule invites
agencies to manipulate form to avoid judicial scrutiny when it is inconvenient or likely to result in reversal-and those are of course the circumstances when review is most needed.
One response to the concerns just outlined might be that recent developments in the D.C. Circuit, limiting the scope of Chaney, have alleviated
these problems and eliminated (or constrained) the ability of agencies to
evade review in this unprincipled manner. The CNJ doctrine and the
"legal issues" exception of UAWand Crowley in particular appear to impose
some controls on agency legislation through enforcement policy, by permitting procedural and occasionally substantive review of such policies. In
fact, however, that is not the case. The solutions adopted by the D.C. Circuit provide only partial, and ultimately unsatisfactory, solutions to the conundrum created by Chaney.
Perhaps the most prominent and often-invoked "exception" to Chaney
is the CN doctrine, which requires agencies to go through the full Notice
and Comment procedures of § 553 of the APA76 when issuing enforcement
guidelines which the agency treats as "binding."77 Richard Thomas has argued that (N7 threatens to substantially undercut the scope of unreviewable discretion created by Chaney.78 In fact, however, the FCC's experience
with permissive detariffing indicates that Notice and Comment procedures
alone are simply inadequate to constrain agency misbehavior. The permissive detariffing rules were issued after full notice and comment, yet the
problem of their inconsistency with statutory mandates remained unresolved. Absent substantive judicial review, which of course Notice and
Comment does not provide,7 9 the core problem created by Chaney, which is
the ability of agencies to avoid judicial review of their regulatory policies by
substituting enforcement guidelines for legislative rules, remains unsolved.
The procedural protections and public participation requirements of Notice and Comment, while perhaps adding some value to the rulemaking
process, simply do not provide the kind of accountability provided byjudicial review. And while the value of judicial review itself might be questioned,8 0 suffice to say that as the episodes recounted in this article
illustrate, some degree of external control over agencies seems essential to
ensure continuing compliance with the rule of law.8 '
76 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
77 See supra notes 4-50, 56-58 and accompanying text.
78 Thomas, supra note 50, at 133-34, 148. Thomas, unlike me, sees this as an unfortunate
development because of his lack of confidence in the efficacy ofjudicial review.
79 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2033-34
(1993)).
80 See supra note 54 (citing numerous modem critiques of the efficacy ofjudicial review of
agency rulemaking).
81 Cass Sunstein has made two important points in this regard-first, that the presumption of
judicial review under the APA is a logical response to the lack of separation-of-powers or electoral
checks on administrative agencies, and generally to the questionable constitutional status of agen-
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Beyond the inefficacy of Notice and Comment, moreover, an argument can be made that procedural requirements such as Notice and Comment simply are not cost-efficient means to regulate agencies in this area.
The burdens imposed by Notice and Comment, in terms of cost and delay,8 2 are well known. The benefits-especially in an area such as the formulation of enforcement policy, where delicate judgments must be made
about resource allocation and prioritization-are less obvious. This problem is magnified when one considers a systematic problem, identified by
several commentators, with imposing Notice and Comment requirements
on agencies which voluntarily choose to publish enforcement policies and
other nonlegislative rules, which are normally exempt from Notice and
Comment procedures 8 3-the "perverse incentive" problem. The point is
that under current law an agency is in no way required to issue such statements, including in particular statements describing the agency's enforcement policies and priorities. Therefore, the predictable consequence of
imposing substantial costs on an agency when it does issue such statements
is to discourage agencies from issuing policy statements at all, and encourage them to proceed on an ad hoc basis. 84 Public statements of enforcement policy, however, are valuable things. Knowledge on the part of
the public of how an agency interprets and intends to enforce its rules
tends to encourage voluntary compliance, to minimize enforcement costs
for agencies as well as the dead-weight social cost of disputes, and to generally increase the openness of agency decisionmaking.8 5 The creation of
significant procedural obstacles to voluntary agency statements of enforcement policy tends to sacrifice all of these benefits by creating strong incentives for the agency to proceed instead on a case-by-case basis in deciding
what purported regulatory violations to pursue. 86 For all of these reasons,
cies; and second, that the very existence of review can act as a check on agency arbitrariness and
lawlessness, even if actual error correction by reviewingjudges is spotty and flawed. See Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 655-56. A full defense ofjudicial review, however, is simply beyond the scope of
this article.
82 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 58, at 403-04. Asimow concludes that the costs of imposing
full Notice and Comment requirements on nonlegislative rulemaking, such as formulation of
enforcement policy, clearly exceed the benefits. See id. at 404-09.
83 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (A) (1994). Nonlegislative rules include "general statements of policy" and "interpretive rules," with enforcement policies generally falling within the former rubric.
84 See Asimow, supranote 58, at 404-09; Thomas, supra note 50, at 152-53, 155-57. Of course,
agencies always have some incentive to publish enforcement policies, since publication permits

agencies to more easily communicate to the regulated community its policies and legal interpretations, and to discipline employees for failing to conform to the agency's enforcement policy.
Also, enforcement policies might be published with some hope of influencingjudicial decisions,
perhaps by triggering Chevron deference. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. But if

large costs become associated with publication, it is predictable that fewer, perhaps substantially
fewer, agencies will find publication of enforcement policies worthwhile on balance.

85 See Asimow, supra note 58, at 387-88 & nn.35-38 (citing numerous legal and social sciences
authorities supporting these propositions).
86 The current D.C. Circuit case law interpreting § 553's exceptions to Notice and Comment
requirements and applying the CNI doctrine in fact magnifies this problem by making the availability of the policy statement exception depend on whether the agency in fact treats its policy
statement as binding, and whether it uses mandatory language in its statement. See supra notes
56-58 and accompanying text. The result, of course, is to encourage agencies to use vague language in their policy statements, or otherwise to depart regularly from their stated policies,
thereby sacrificing the benefits of certainty. SeeProfessionals and Patients for Customized Care v.
Shalala, 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding an FDA Compliance Manual not subject to Notice
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the imposition of Notice and Comment procedures on the issuance of enforcement guidelines, as the CM case and its progeny seek to do, is of questionable wisdom, and in any event does not impose the kind of direct
accountability needed to constrain agency lawlessness.
Another, perhaps more direct response to the "Chaney problem" can
be found in the "legal issues" exception to Chaney developed in International Union, UAW v. Brock.87 This exception directly responds to the evasive uses of Chaney by agencies seeking to avoid judicial scrutiny, by carving
out what seem to be the types of agency pronouncements most in need of
judicial review-i.e., statutory interpretations which purport to state the
legal obligations of regulated entities-from the nonreviewability presumption of Chaney.8 s The difficulty with the legal issues exception as originally
stated, however, is that it proves either too much or too little. As Judge
Williams pointed out in Crowleys9 in the course of limiting the legal issues
exception, the problem is that almost every agency nonenforcement decision has some element of legal interpretation. A decisionmaker might of
course decide not to prosecute a violation, or a class of violations, purely
because of limited resources; but more likely such ajudgment is also going
to be based on an assessment that the conduct in question does not violate
the underlying legal rule, or perhaps arguably does not violate the legal
rule, and therefore the agency's chances of success are in doubt and/or
litigation is likely to be expensive. Indeed, a decision not to prosecute
might stem from ajudgment that for independent policy reasons the conduct should not be prevented, or is a lower enforcement priority, even
though the conduct probably does violate the legal norm.90 Sifting the
"legal interpretation" from the policy judgments in such a decision is wellnigh impossible, and therefore a "legal issues" exception will either swallow
the general presumption of nonreviewability, or it will affect a trivially small
number of cases. In fact, as Judge Williams further pointed out, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, has relied on just this conundrum to prohibit courts from "carving reviewable legal rulings out
from the middle of non-reviewable actions," 91 as the UAWcourt purported
to do.
and Comment on such grounds); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Anthony, supra note 58, at 1318-19; Thomas, supranote 50, at 152-53. The denouement of
the CAT litigation illustrates this problem perfectly, see supranote 9, as does the Second Circuit's
decision in New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995), which also
seems to reward agency arbitrariness.
87 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986), overruLd by Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pefia, 37 F.3d
671 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See supra notes 3--37 and accompanying text.
88 See InternationalUnion, UAW, 783 F.2d at 246.
89 Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676-77.

90 The FCC's detariffing policy is one example of this type of judgment. In addition, the
Federal Trade Commission, in its previous enforcement policies, apparently took such an approach towards efficiency-producing horizontal mergers, stating that even though such a merger
might violate § 7 of the Clayton Act (because it considered efficiencies irrelevant to the legal
analysis under that provision), the FTC would consider efficiencies in making the "policy"judgment of whether to pursue enforcement. See Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102, at 20,528 (June 14, 1982). I am grateful to Alan Meese for this example.
91 Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676 (dtingICCv. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283
(1987)).
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The solution adopted by Judge Williams in Crowley, and the way in
which he reconciled his decision with Circuit precedent, was to limit the
reviewability doctrine of UAW to a "statement of a general enforcement
policy" which the agency has "expressed as a formal regulation... or has
otherwise articulated in some form of universal policy statement." 92 Such
general statements, Judge Williams explains, are far more likely to contain
broad legal interpretations regarding statutory requirements, or, perhaps,
to represent improper abdication of an agency's statutory responsibilities.
Finally, general enforcement policies are easier to review, because they
present clearer statements of an agency's reasons for declining to prosecute. 93 Therefore, substantive review of enforcement policies, but not of
individual nonenforcement decisions, should limit the damage caused by
Chaney without pushing courts into the morass of reviewing agency resource allocation decisions.
Crowley represents an important step forward in the rationalization of
the Chaney doctrine. The concerns identified and, at least to some degree,
resolved by Judge Williams lie at the core of this article-i.e., the misuse of
Chaney by agencies to evade review of unlawful policies, and the interchangeability of enforcement policies with substantive rules. The Crowley
solution is, however, ultimately incomplete. At the outset, the precise
scope of the holding in Crowley remains unclear. Crowley could be read to
authorize courts to undertake full and complete review of all formal agency
statements of enforcement policy. If so, Crowley provides a solution to a
number of the difficulties generated by the Chaney doctrine. In particular,
plenary review of all enforcement policy statements seems to resolve the
problem-illustrated by the FCC's implementation of its permissive detariffing policy-of agencies characterizing what are for all intents and purposes rulemakings as enforcement policy statements, for the sole purpose
of avoiding judicial review. 94 But Crowley could also be read to permit review only of legal issues raised by enforcement policies and not to authorize review of the components of such policy statements dealing with, for
example, resource allocation or enforcement priorities based on independent policy judgments. 95 This narrower reading, which seems more consistent with the Chaney Court's and the D.C. Circuit's prior statements
regarding the need to retain agency discretion over these kinds of issues,
does not fully address even the characterization problem, because it per92 Id. at 676. It should be noted that Crow/ey's suggestion that agency statements of enforcement policy are reviewable is in tension with previous opinions by the D.C. Circuit, including in

the original MCI opinion's reference to permissive detariffing. See supra note 21; MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also National Treasury
Employees Union v. Homer, 854 F.2d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93 Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677.
94 It should be noted, however, that even if the broader reading of Crowley does prevail, and it
does provide a fairly effective solution to the problems created by the Chaney doctrine, there is no
guarantee that its holding would be adopted by circuits other than the D.C. Circuit, or that it
would be ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court as consistent with Chaney.
95 See Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676 (stating that enforcement policies are reviewable for "legal sufficiency"). The roots of Crowey in the "legal issues" exception to Chaney also suggest this limitation
on the scope of review.
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mits agencies to avoid review by simply restating substantive policies as
96
judgments about enforcement priorities grounded in resource concerns.
In any event, whichever reading of Crowley is ultimately adopted by the
courts, the decision leaves some difficult questions unresolved. First of all,
there is an assumption underlying Crowley that enforcement policies will be
more clearly "legal" than individual decisions and so more important to
review as well as more easily reviewed; but this is far from obviously true,
since the application of general rules to specific fact situations often raises
profound interpretational issues.9 7 Even more importantly, limiting review
to enforcement policies as Crowley does recreates in full the "perverse incentives" problem discussed with respect to Notice and Comment procedures and the CATI doctrine. Any added burden on the issuance of
enforcement policy statements will encourage agencies to proceed case-bycase, thereby forgoing the societal value of clearly stated enforcement policies. One response to this objection might be that if an agency chooses to
proceed case-by-case, it loses its ability to make general policy without subjecting it to judicial review (this response is implicit in Crowley). However,
this is not really true. Most obviously, agencies are quite capable of announcing general policies in the course of an individual nonenforcement
decision-as, for example, the SEC did in the no-action letter at issue in
NYCER 98 Judge Williams in Crowley acknowledges this point, and suggests
that in that circumstance review might be available; 99 but distinguishing
individual decisions from statements of policy may not be so easy, because
an agency may not state its legal understandings and intentions as explicitly
as the SEC did in NYCER For example, an agency might use an individual
nonenforcement decision to announce its understanding of the underlying
statute, as happened in Crowley, thereby permitting regulated entities to
clearly discern its enforcement policy; and it might then reinforce this implicit message by enforcing, and refusing to enforce, the statute consistent
with that understanding. In this instance, the agency has clearly announced an enforcement policy, but has never formulated its intentions in
a formal enforcement policy statement which would be reviewable under
Crowley. In other words, enforcement policies can be developed and expressed through broad or informal statements combined with patterns of
individual decisions as well as through general, formal policy statements. 10 0
96 Again, the FTC's prior policy towards efficiency-producing mergers would appear to illustrate such a situation. See supra note 90.
97 Compare Levin, supra note 5, at 765 & n.390 (making a similar point about nonpromulgadon of rules versus individual nonenforcement decisions). As the following discussion indicates,
Crowley itself and the Second Circuit's NYCFR decision provide examples of situations where an
agency faced and resolved an important legal issue in the course of an individual nonenforcement decision.
98 New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.Sd 7 (2d Cir. 1995). See supra note
59.
99 Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677.
100 In fact, an agency could conceivably formulate and communicate an enforcement policy
purely through a pattern of enforcement, without any actual statements whatsoever, whether formal or informal. Perhaps not as quickly or effectively, but it could be done. An example of this
phenomenon might be the enforcement of the (former) 55 m.p.h. speed limit on highways,
especially in western states. The 55 m.p.h. rule simply was not enforced in many states, and
certainly not in California. Police tended to set their detecting instruments, and stop violators, at
a significantly higher speed-anecdotal evidence suggests it was around 65 m.p.h. This policy
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Indeed, in the rulemaking context the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the right of agencies to develop policies through individual, adjudicatory decisions rather than through formal rulemaking. 10 1 And in the
regulatory context, the ability of agencies to proceed through informal policies and exhibited patterns of activity is enhanced by the fact that regulated communities are often relatively homogeneous and cohesive, and
regulation is often pervasive. As a result, when an agency acts pursuant to
an informal (or perhaps even unannounced or secret) policy, patterns are
likely to emerge, and be observed, more quickly than with laws applicable
to the general public, especially if the enforcement pattern is supplemented with informal, unreviewable agency statements hinting at the underlying policy. The consequence is that even under Crowley, agencies
retain some significant ability to make policy and implement rules, while
avoiding judicial review.
The inability of the "legal issues" exception to confine the damage to
principles of judicial review inflicted by the Chaney doctrine points to a
deeper problem in the assumptions underlying the Chaney decision, a problem which also permeates the lower courts' attempts to limit or avoid the
implications of the Court's decision. Briefly, the line drawn in Chaney between presumptively reviewable and presumptively unreviewable agency
decisions rests on a distinction between positive law, i.e., rules of conduct
laid down by a legislative authority, and enforcement policy, meaning an
agency's decisions regarding whether to pursue certain violations of those
rules. The D.C. Circuit in InternationalUnion, UAWalso relied on this distinction in creating the "legal issue" exception to Chaney, by emphasizing
the purported differences between "an agency's announcement of how it
will exercise its discretion, [and] an agency's announcement of what a citizen's duties are under a statute." 0 2 In fact, however, it is a relatively elementary legal realist insight that when there is a single enforcement
authority, a decision not to enforce under stated circumstances is indistinguishable from amending the underlying "rule" to exempt the affected
conduct from prohibition. Enforcement is legal prohibition, and lack of
enforcement is legal permission. The contrary view, that enforcement policy is fundamentally different from "law," rests on a formalistic definition of
law which has been largely discarded since the realist revolution of a half
century ago. The ephemerality of the line drawn by Chaney explains why
the FCC was able to alternatively claim its permissive detariffing policy was
either a substantive rule or an enforcement policy-because absent a second enforcement authority, there is no difference between the two. This is
also why the FDA, in the CAT litigation, was able to characterize its Action
was never stated, but it was easily observable over time, and clearly had been so observed by
drivers. Therefore, the effective speed limit on highways in these states was not 55 m.p.h., as even
the briefest excursion onto a California freeway demonstrated. This type of unstated pattern of
underenforcement can be contrasted with the stated policy of underenforcement in, for example, the State of Montana. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-718, 61-11-103 (1995) (establishing $5
fine for violation of federally mandated speed limit, and prohibiting any record to be kept of
same).
101 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947).
102 International Union, UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Levels, which look very much like legislative standards, as statements of
enforcement policy.' 03 In both cases, the line between the two characterizations is a purely formal one, with little or no substantive significance.
But, of course, the distinction was crucial under Chaney for the availability
of judicial review. To rest reviewability on such a contentless distinctionas Chaney does, and as UAWdid as well, though with a different emphasisis bad law and bad policy.
The above argument contains a caveat which bears examination. Enforcement policy is equivalent to rules of conduct only when there is a
single enforcement authority (or when the enforcement policy binds all
enforcement authorities). When independent enforcement exists-most
commonly through private rights of action-a chasm develops between enforcement policy and substantive rules, because enforcement policy does
not technically bind private parties. 10 4 It was precisely because the Communications Act does contain a private right of action that the FCC eventually was forced to take a firm stance on the nature of its permissive
detariffing rules (for rules they turned out to be). This suggests that when
a private right of action does exist, the need for review of enforcement
policies and decisions is less critical. 0 5 But private rights of action are far
from the norm in modern regulatory schemes, and where they do not exist,
the above analysis strongly suggests that the distinctions drawn in Chaney
and its progeny are unsatisfactory. 0 6 Moreover, there is a lurking issue
here over whether enforcement policy might in fact bind even private prosecutors, because of potential Chevron deference to statutory interpretations
103 The difficulty of distinguishing enforcement policies from substantive rules is well illustrated by the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
in which the court rejected the FDA's argument that its promulgation of a standard for "substantial compliance" under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act constituted an enforcement
action, unreviewable under Chaney, but did not give any explanation for this conclusion.
104 Private rights of action are, of course, not the only means through which private parties
can "enforce" rules of conduct. For example, violation of such rules can sometimes arise as a
defense to a common-law claim, such as a contract action. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,
455 U.S. 72 (1982) (permitting defense in contract action based on alleged violation of antitrust
laws). In addition, the "filed-rate doctrine" permits regulated firms to collect fees based on rates
filed in tariffs, even in the face of contrary contractual agreement, thereby indirectly enforcing
the statutory requirement of charging only filed rates-though perversely, the enforcement in
this instance is by the regulated entity who has originally violated the relevant rule. See Maislin
Indus. v. Primary Steel, 497 U.S. 116 (1990). The arguments made in the text apply to some
degree to these situations as well, but I am primarily concerned with private rights of action here,
because they provide the most consistent and dependable means for private parties to enforce
rules. The other avenues available tend to be subject to special factual predicates which are often
beyond the control of those who are injured by violations.
105 Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1215-16 & n.83, suggest that courts may draw just
such a distinction; see also NYCER, 45 F.3d at 14 (denying substantive review of SEC no-action
letter because of the availability of a private cause of action). I discuss the possibility of such a
limit on a right to judicial review infra, at notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
106 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 671-72. It should be noted that in the case of malum in se
offenses, some independent "enforcement" might be created through the moral weight of the
community as well, rather than through legal processes alone, suggesting that for malum in se
offenses review of enforcement policies is less needed. On the other hand, malum in se offenses
tend to be more socially harmful than malum prohibitumn offenses, suggesting that review of enforcement policy is more needed here. And in any event, most regulatory offenses tend to be
malum prohibitum rather than malum in se.
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stated in such a policy.10 7 There is an argument that Chevron deference
should not be given to such informal interpretations, but the case law,
though far from clear on this point, suggests that deference will be
given. 108 Suffice it to say that the possibility of Chevron deference makes
enforcement policy even less distinguishable from formal rules, and more
in need of scrutiny.
The Chaney Court defends the distinction it draws between agency
nonenforcement decisions and other kinds of agency action on the
grounds that "when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise
its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights." 10 9 Drawing
on this argument, one might respond to the above points by suggesting
that enforcement policies are not the same as substantive rules, because
they do not coercively forbid conduct, as regulations generally do, and so
are less in need of judicial review. This response fails, however, for any
number of reasons. To begin with, the Chaney Court's argument does not
appear to be fully consistent with the policies expressed in the APA's provisions defining agency "action" to include a "failure to act," and authorizing
review when action is "unlawfully withheld" or if an agency officer "failed to
act-"1 0 Perhaps more substantively, the premise of the argument itself is
not really true with respect to at least some kinds of agency actions to which
Chaney has been applied. In a world of vague statutory standards, enforcement and nonenforcement policies can delineate the scope of forbidden
conduct just as substantive rules can-the FDA's use of Action Levels in
CNfbeing a prime example. But this objection does not apply to individual
nonenforcement decisions, where the State's coercive power indeed is not
being invoked against regulated entities. The question arises, therefore,
whether those decisions should be unreviewable, even if enforcement policies, including informal policies and policies expressed through patterns of
enforcement decisions, are subject to review."' Cass Sunstein has convincingly presented one reason why the answer is No: the Chaney Court's as107

But see Kelly v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107-09 (D.C. Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900

(1995) (holding that courts should not grant Chevron deference to agency interpretations while
resolving suits brought pursuant to a private right of action). See generally RichardJ. Pierce, Jr.,
Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADmIN. L. REv. 1 (1996) (arguing
that Kelly is wrongly decided, and that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations
even when resolving private lawsuits).
108 See Reno v. Korey, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2026-27 (1995) (granting deference to internal agency
guideline because it is "akin" to an interpretive rule); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 &
n.9 (1977) (pre-Chevron case suggesting a limit on deference); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for
Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181-82 (3rd Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 816 (1996) (granting
Chevron deference to interpretive rule, even though the rule is not subject to Notice and Comment procedures); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 953 (D.C. Circuit 1987)
(Starr, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Chevron deference would be due to nonlegislative rules in
subsequent enforcement proceedings); Robert A. Anthony, Wich Agency InterpretationsShould
Bind Citizens and Courts?,7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 55-60 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeferenceto
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 973 & nn.13-14, 987 (1992).
109 Chancy, 470 U.S. at 832.
110 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994) (defining agency action to include a "failure to act"); id. at
§ 706 (permitting review of "agency action unlawfully withheld"); id. at § 702 (authorizing review
if agency officer "failed to act").
111 It is in fact possible to read the Chancy opinion as establishingjust such a rule, especially in
light of the numerous exceptions to the principle of nonreviewability recognized in Chancy itself.
See Chancy, 470 U.S. at 833-36.
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sumption that coercive agency action requires judicial control, but
noncoercive action-in which an agency "merely" fails to protect regulatory beneficiaries from the conduct of regulated entities-does not require
judicial scrutiny, is based on a Lochnerianbaseline understanding that only
common law rights are worthy ofjudicial protection. Sunstein argues convincingly that in the modem administrative state regulatory benefits and
rights-i.e., those created by statutory schemes-are of equal importance
and are equally worthy of protection, and that therefore the Chaney Court's
understanding that regulatory beneficiaries need not be accorded legal
rights has no place in modern law. 112 In a similar vein, Robert Anthony has
argued that nonenforcement policies which create "safe harbors"-such as
the Action Levels in CN-can create "binding norms," both by defining
through negative implication conduct that is not permitted, and by limiting
the scope of the statutory offense. 113 Under this view, which the abovequoted language of the APA appears to endorse, nonenforcement decisions should be subject to judicial review because they deny regulatory beneficiaries protected rights, even if they do not expose regulated entities to
4
coercive action."1
The criticism of the Chaney Court's reliance on arbitrary baselines
points to another problem with the opinion's distinction between coercive
and noncoercive agency actions, which is that it rests on faulty understandings of the role and extent of government regulation. One of the key conclusions reached by the Court in Chaney was that coercive enforcement
actions require judicial scrutiny, but nonenforcement decisions do not, because only the former threaten common law rights. 115 This conclusion,
however, contains a lurking assumption. The assumption is that regulation-meaning governmental controls-is the exception, and that most activities of most regulated entities occur free of regulatory constraints. If the
Court were not making this assumption, its distinction between coercive
and noncoercive actions would make little sense, because in a world of pervasive regulation, nonenforcement decisions, because of their substantial
role in formulating regulatory policy, can have a significant impact on the
economic well-being of regulated firms, thereby threatening core, common
law entitlements. But, of course, in the modern administrative state, a
huge number of industries are characterized by pervasive regulation, where
almost any activity of the regulated entities occurs within a web of regulatory requirements." 6 When an agency overseeing such an industry enforces one part of a regulatory scheme but not another, or exempts
particular entities from regulatory requirements, it is effectively amending
comprehensive regulatory schemes. In addition to possibly thwarting the
112 See Sunstein, supranote 5, at 666-69 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
113 See Anthony, supranote 58, at 1329, 1339-40.
114 See also Chaney, 470 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); Peter HA
Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 627 (1983); Levy &
Duncan, supra note 5, at 623-30.
115 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
116 Examples include the FCC's regulation of the telecommunications industry, and increasingly of the cable industry; the SEC's regulation of the securities industry; the Federal Reserve's
regulation of the banking industry;, the FDA's regulation of the pharmaceutical industry;, the
NRC's regulation of the nuclear power industry; and countless others.
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will of the legislature, such selective enforcement can have a substantial
competitive effect on other regulated entities who are not given the benefit
of nonenforcement.' 7 All in all, the effect of selective nonenforcement
can be to substantially modify, and sometimes to thwart or skew, regulatory
schemes, thereby causing direct injury to some portion of the public or of
the regulated community-presumably that portion which is complaining
about the agency's actions. The consequent competitive disadvantage
causes pecuniary losses, and so impairs a common-law property right of
precisely the sort which courts have traditionally protected. This possibility
provides yet another reason why nonenforcement decisions should, as a
matter of sound policy, be subject to judicial scrutiny.
The above analysis, including in particular my criticisms of the Chaney
Court's and the D.C. Circuit's distinctions between enforcement policy and
rules of conduct, and between coercive and noncoercive agency actions, in
fact point to a deeper problem with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chaney, a problem which is illustrated by the Court's reliance in Chaney on an
analogy between agency nonenforcement decisions and criminal
prosecutorial discretion. One of the many arguments presented by Justice
Rehnquist in Chaney for exempting nonenforcement decisions from judicial review is that such a decision "shares to some extent the characteristics
of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a
decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch.""u 8 This analogy is closely related to the Court's coercion/
noncoercion distinction. After all, the judiciary does review criminal indictments (through the grand jury and the criminal process generally), but
does not review failures to prosecute, because victims of crimes generally
do not have a legal right to invoke the government's prosecutorial
power." 9 It is similarly related to the Court's distinction between enforcement policy and substantive rules, because rules of conduct, which are the
province of the legislature in the criminal context, are regularly reviewed
and interpreted by the judiciary, while enforcement policy, the province of
0
the executive, is not except in the most extraordinary circumstances.' 2
The Court's analogy, however, is flawed-agency nonenforcement decisions are not similar to decisions not to indict in the criminal context.
The reason is a simple one: in the criminal context, the traditional constitutional separation of powers remains in force, while in the context of most
agency actions, it is nonexistent. Agencies exercise legislative powers
(through rulemaking), executive powers (when invoking their enforcement authority), and judicial power (when adjudicating complaints);121
117 This was AT&T's complaint in the litigation over the FCC's permissive detariffing policythat the FCC's selective enforcement of tariffing rules against only AT&T placed AT&T at a serious competitive disadvantage. See AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
118 Chany, 470 U.S. at 882.
119 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
120 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). It is noteworthy that Wayte was decided
the day before Chaney.
121 Of course, within agencies these functions might be delegated and divided up among
different personnel, such as ALJs, an Enforcement Division or General Counsel, and other staff,
but ultimate authority over these functions generally remains with the Commission or agency
head in whom Congress has invested the agency's powers.
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and in a typical enforcement proceeding against a regulated entity, all
three types of power are often involved. 122 The FCC's experience with permissive detariffing and the FDA's use of Action Levels demonstrate, moreover, that it is precisely this lack of separation of powers which permits
agencies to use the Chaney doctrine to evade review of substantive policies.
As I have discussed above, it is a relatively straightforward legal realist insight that prosecutorial policy can be the equivalent of lawmaking. But it is
only when prosecutorial and lawmaking powers are exercised by the same
entity that it becomes problematic for the law to establish separate rules
governing the two types of power, as the Chaney doctrine does by exempting a particular variety of agency action-the exercise of enforcement discretion-from judicial review. The consequence of such differentiation is
to drive policymaking and rulemaking activities by agencies into enforcement policy. In other words, it may be perfectly sensible for institutional
reasons for there to be fewer constraints on the exercise of criminal enforcement discretion by the Executive than on the exercise of lawmaking
powers by the Congress, 128 but it makes no sense124to treat a single agency's
exercise of those two types of power differently.
For all of these reasons, the rule-of-law arguments in favor of judicial
review when an agency exercises rulemaking or adjudicative powers apply
fully to the exercise of enforcement discretion. When the agency implements its regulatory policies, it often makes no difference from the point of
view of both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries whether the
agency is purporting to exercise "legislative" power or "executive" power.
And therefore the Chaney Court's reliance on this distinction to justify a
rule of nonreview is indefensible.

122 Indeed, the lack of separation-of-powers checks on agencies provides one of the strongest
arguments in favor of broad, searching judicial review of all forms of agency action. It seems a
matter of common sense that because in the administrative state traditional constraints on abuse
of power by governmental actors have been removed, something must take their place-and
judicial review appears to be the only plausible candidate for this role. See Sunstein, supra note 5,
at 655-56. There are, of course, some electoral checks on agency abuse of power, but I would
argue (recognizing that this is a controversial proposition) that in the context of the huge modem executive branch, in which only the President is elected, the extent to which agencies are
actually politically answerable is quite limited. CompareSunstein, supranote 5, at 655-56 (arguing
that lack of electoral checks on agencies supports judicial review) with Thomas, supra note 50, at
140 & n.66 (citing Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. Rxv. v (1982)) (linking
modem academic defense of administrative autonomy to the political answerability of agencies).
123 An argument can be made that even criminal prosecutorial discretion is based historically
on the availability of private prosecutions, a premise which of course no longer holds. See Chaney,
470 U.S. at 849 n.6 (citingJohn Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretionin Gemany, 41 U. CHI.
L. REv. 439, 443-46 (1974)). The wisdom of permitting broad prosecutorial discretion in the
criminal context is, however, beyond the scope of this article. See generally KENNT C. DAVIS,
DiSCiEtmONARYJusTICE 188-214 (1969).
124 This suggests in turn that when an administrative scheme does contain an independent
prosecutorial authority, as is the case for example with the NLRB General Counsel's authority to
enforce the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1994), or with the Secretary of Labor's authority to
enforce OSHA, see 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1994), the arguments in favor ofjudicial review presented in
this article are less compelling. See Levin, supra note 5, at 773-74. I will not pursue this point
further than to acknowledge that in those relatively rare cases, application of the Chaney doctrine
is less problematic.
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A WORKABLE MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Having concluded that, contrary to conclusions of the Chaney Court,
judicial review of agency enforcement policy and nonenforcement decisions is desirable as a matter of sound policy, the question to be confronted
is whether such review is possible and practical. The difficulties that courts
generally face when trying to review agency inaction, and especially when
reviewing nonenforcement decisions, are well known 2 5 and lie at the core
of the Chaney Court's reasoning. 126 Perhaps most importantly, nonenforcement decisions tend to involve a complex balancing of many factors, including the likelihood of success in litigation and whether agency
resources are better spent elsewhere, which courts are not well placed to
review. In addition, it is often difficult to identify when an agency has
failed to act-at the least, delay and inaction can be difficult to distinguish-so that there is often no clear focus for judicial review of agency
inaction. And finally, even if inaction can be identified and reviewed, it is
not always apparent what remedy is available, since ajudicial order to com27
mence an enforcement proceeding is both constitutionally troubling
and perhaps unworkable considering the ease with which such an order
could be evaded. For all of these reasons, there are substantial practical
barriers to a regime of pervasive, searching judicial review of agency nonenforcement decisions.
Nonetheless, a system of effective review of agency nonenforcement,
one that would address the worst problems generated by the current Chaney regime of presumptive nonreview, is, I believe, workable. The solution
to the practical difficulties described above can be found in the now wellestablished administrative law principle which grounds review of agency action in a requirement that the agency state reasons for its decision, and
then confines judicial review to the agency's stated reasons.' 2 8 This principle, which is generally associated with the Supreme Court's decision in SEC
v. Chenery Corp.,'

29

is of great value in formulating a workable system of

review of agency nonenforcement decisions because it permits courts to
review both the rationality of an agency's stated reasons for declining to
enforce, and the consistency of the current inaction with past behavior and
stated policy, but otherwise to defer to agencies on the specific choices they
make. 130 In addition, it permits courts to remedy improper agency deci125 See, e.g., Lehner, supra note 114, at 638; Levin, supra note 5, at 715-16; Stewart & Sunstein,
supra note 75, at 1283-84; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 672-73.
126 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
127 Cf. Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
128 For an excellent discussion of the agency "duty to explain" and its role in current administrative law, see Gary Larson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Ageny Duties of Explanationfor Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERs L. Ruv. 313 (1996). See generallyBERNARD ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTrATIVE LAW
§§ 7.30, 10.4 (1991); 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994).
129 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). For a description of the development of this principle in early
administrative law, and its application in a related context, see Levin, supra note 5, at 722 & n.
109.
130 For examples of cases applying the statement-of-reasons approach to review of nonenforcement decisions, see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1975); Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368,
1372-74 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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sions by remanding, and ordering the agency to take a second look, without having to directly intrude upon agency discretion. This remedial
approach avoids the constitutional difficulties (if any) which might arise
from courts ordering actual agency action. As a consequence judicial review based on a statement-of-reasons requirement, like the modem "hard
look" review which it has spawned,' 3 ' should not substantially interfere
with an agency's own decisionmaking and policymaking powers. Thus if
reviewing judges in such a regime exercise their powers properly, final control over an agency's allocation of its resources and its formulation of substantive policy should remain
with the agency, rather than being
32
transferred to the courts.

In applying these principles to the specific context of agency nonenforcement decisions, some adjustment is necessary in light of the pragmatic
concerns discussed above. In particular, a system ofjudicial review in this
area must rest centrally on a requirement-one new to administrative law
and representing an admittedly significant departure from existing practice-that agencies state, and then consistently follow, a rational policy regarding enforcement priorities and disposition of enforcement resources.
Actual application of this policy to specific factual settings will remain
largely within the discretion of the agency. The enforcement policy might
consist of relatively precise rules; or it might be a list of the standards and
factors the agency will consider in deciding whether to pursue a particular
action, along with some explanation of how those factors will be weighed.
In either case, once an agency has stated an enforcement policy, judicial
review of its substance should be available. In particular, relatively searching review should be available for those aspects of the policy which incorporate substantive policy judgments or establish effectively binding norms,
whether permissive or prohibitive, though of course, even such searching
review must ultimately defer to reasonable policyjudgments made by agencies, so long as they are consistent with legal norms. Review of the discretionary aspects of that policy, especially those aspects dealing with resource
allocation issues and other questions of prioritization, can however be
quite deferential, thus balancing the need for agency autonomy in administrative matters with the need for judicial supervision of policymaking and
rulemaking. And this deference should extend both to review of the relevant aspects of the policy statement itself, and to individual nonenforcement decisions premised on those considerations. Finally, when a
reviewing court is faced with mixed explanations of agency policy-for example, a decision to place lower priority on prosecuting certain violations
131 See supra note 54; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
132 For a discussion of the capacity of such methods ofjudicial review to avoid "usurpation" of
agency prerogatives, see Sunstein, supra note 5, at 671 & nn.109-11; id. at 668 n.99. There is, of
course, always some danger that reviewing courts will improperly seize such powers, and permit
judicial policy preferences to outweigh informed choices made by agencies. But that danger does
not seem any more present with respect to nonenforcement decisions than with any other variety
of agency action, suggesting that this criticism is more an attack on the entire institution ofjudicial review than on review in any particular context. As stated supranote 81, beyond noting that
there are good institutional reasons for its preservation, a broad defense of judicial review is
beyond the scope of this article.
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based both on a lack of resources, and a substantive policy judgment that
the violation is of less concern-the reviewing court must separate out
these different components of the agency's reasoning in selecting the standard of review. Thus in the example given, if the court concludes that the
agency's substantive policy judgment is unreasonable, the court can remand for the agency to reconsider its prioritization, without questioning
the basic principle that an agency with limited resources is entitled to set
some enforcement priorities, and in the course of setting such priorities
make reasonable judgments about what kinds of violations cause the most
social harm.
This regime achieves most of the objectives set out above for an effective system of judicial review, and it does so at relatively limited cost. The
benefit of mandating a statement of enforcement policy is that it will force
agencies to formulate and explain their enforcement priorities. As Justice
Frankfurther once said, "[t]hose who decide should record their judgments and give reasons for them, which procedure will in itself have a fruitful psychological effect. We feel much more responsibility-always do-if
we write down why we think what we think."' 33 But the current system, of
reviewing enforcement policies, but not requiring them, has the perverse
effect of discouraging agencies from creating written explanations for their
decisions. Compelling (or strongly encouraging) agencies to state their enforcement policies addresses this problem in current law. In addition,
grounding review in a required statement of general policy has the advantage of permitting courts to more easily review substantive rules and policies implemented by agencies in the guise of enforcement policy.'3 As
discussed above, the remedial difficulty courts face in reviewing nonenforcement is also addressed, since courts can remand for further explana35
tion without commanding that an agency pursue an enforcement action.'
Another, and perhaps the most important, benefit of such an approach is
that once an agency has stated its general policy, or standards, regarding
enforcement, courts will have a much easier time spotting and preventing
inconsistent or arbitrary actions, since a particular decision can at least be
assessed against a stated policy and prior applications of that policy. Thus
the costs recounted above which flow from unpredictability and arbitrariness in agency enforcement strategy 3 6 would at least be reduced by a sys133 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on
S.674, S.675 and S.918, 77th Cong. 338 (1941) (statement of Commissioner Healy); see also Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.) ("[W]riting disciplines thought. We should not create disincentives to" the
creation of written explanations.).
134 See supra Part II.
135 See supranotes 130-31 and accompanying text. A difficult question would arise if an agency
ignored judicial commands, or repeatedly presented inadequate reasons for a refusal to act, and
a reviewing court felt obliged to order action. The Court in Dunlop acknowledged this problem,
but declined to address it, preferring to believe the situation was unlikely to occur. Dunlop, 421
U.S. at 575-76 & n.12. My own inclination is to think that the separation-of-powers concerns
raised regarding a court ordering an agency to commence enforcement proceedings are somewhat artificial, in light of all the other departures from separation-of-powers principles in an
agency's day-to-day operation. But like the Court, I am inclined to think the situation is unlikely
to arise very frequently.
136 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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tem ofjudicial review based on a requirement of following a stated policy.
And finally, a requirement of consistency with stated policy would sharply
limit the ability of agencies to evade judicial review of substantive rules and
policy which are communicated through patterns of enforcement decisions
combined with informal agency statements, or even patterns of activity undertaken alone, 3 7 because a pattern of enforcement which has not been
set out in the enforcement policy would soon become obvious to reviewing
courts. If it did not, it is unlikely to be effectively communicated to regulated entities, which would largely eliminate the usefulness of such a course
of action.138
On the other hand, highly deferential review under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard139 of those aspects of an agency's stated policy which
involve administrative and discretionary matters, such as the best allocation
of limited resources, or the prioritization of socially harmful violations,
would permit agencies to retain largely untrammeled authority in those
areas where they need it the most, thereby addressing the gravest pragmatic concerns raised by the Chaney Court. Moreover, in these areas the
courts should permit statements of policy in relatively general terms, and
should not reverse an individual agency decision unless there is a clear
inconsistency with either the stated policy or with previous applications of
that policy. Again, such an approach seems necessary if review of nonenforcement decisions is to be implemented without destroying all agency
flexibility. Of course, as with any system of deference, there is a danger
that agencies will seek to exploit their relative independence in this aspect
of their enforcement discretion and advance other agency goals using the
guise of discretionary decisions. But the need to hide such policies from
judicial watchdogs will make it much more difficult to communicate the
agency's intentions to the regulated community, thereby making such evasionary tactics of little use as a practical matter, for much the same reasons
that a requirement of publishing formal statements of enforcement policies makes it more difficult to use informally expressed or uncommunicated patterns of enforcement to establish norms.
As has probably become obvious, the key to the above-described regime ofjudicial review is the availability of different standards of review for
different aspects of an agency's enforcement policy. When the reasons an
agency states for nonenforcement rest on discretionary factors such as resource allocation, and concomitantly when courts are reviewing aspects of
an agency's enforcement policy dealing with such factors, review must be
deferential. But when a decision or policy rests on statutory interpretation
or a substantive policy judgment, review can be more searching. 140 And
when both elements are present in a single decision or policy, the court
must modulate its level of scrutiny depending on what element of the deci137 See supra note 100.
138 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
139 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994).
140 For an example of a court engaging in such searching review in a nonenforcement context, see Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For an early instance of such an approach, see Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacating as moot 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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sion it is reviewing at the moment. This concept-that the standard of
review will vary based on the aspect of the agency decision being reviewed-is hardly foreign to administrative law. Most obviously, the APA
sets out a number of distinct standards of review courts must apply in reviewing agency action. 14 1 But the insight seems to have entirely escaped
the Chaney Court, which concluded that because nonenforcement decisions often will rest, at least in part, on discretionary factors difficult to
review, the entire category of nonenforcement decisions should be presumptively unreviewable.14 2 The Court's conclusion, however, is a non sequitur. In determining whether an agency action (or inaction) is
reviewable, as a logical matter a court must consider the nature of the claim
advanced by the challenging party. Indeed, the very language of the
Court's "no law to apply" formulation of the APA § 701 (a) (2) exemption
from review implies such a limitation since with respect to certain claims
there will always be "law to apply.' 43 Thus even when an agency action is
generally unreviewable, certain kinds of challenges to the action-a constitutional challenge, for example, or a claim of extraordinary agency misconduct-will almost always be reviewable. This in turn suggests that even the
most seemingly discretionary types of agency action generally are, and
should be, subject to at least partial review.144 It is then but a small step to
the suggestion that the type and level ofjudicial scrutiny can and should be
adjusted to the particular challenge advanced against the agency actionthe only difference from the partial reviewability regime described above
being that claims addressed at discretionary aspects of decisions will generate extremely deferential review, rather than no review at all. 1 After all, if
different aspects of agency decisions can be separated out for purposes of
reviewability, as a logical matter they can also be separated out in choosing
a standard of review. None of these possibilities seems to have been considered by the Chaney Court when it adopted its across-the-board rule restricting review.
The Supreme Court's resistance to the possibility of modulated review
in Chaney appears to be closely tied to its understanding, exemplified by its
decision in ICC v. Brotherhoodof Locomotive Engineers (BLE), that reviewability is an all-or-nothing proposition. 46 Because of the sharp distinction the
Court has drawn between the question of reviewability and the choice of a
141 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (setting forth various standards to be applied in judicial review of
agency action).
142 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
143 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 658-59. The "committed to agency discretion" language of
the APA itself also supports such a limitation, since it seems clear that agencies never have discretion to act for some reasons, such as racial or religious animus.
144 See Levin, supra note 5, at 700-02 (discussing Sunstein's understanding of reviewability, and
pointing out that the Supreme Court, in cases like Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), has implicitly
recognized that some claims are almost always reviewable); see also id. at 746-50 (reciting benefits of a regime of partial reviewability); Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook,J.) (endorsing view that otherwise unreviewable decision may be reviewable
for certain types of challenges).
145 See Levin, supra note 5, at 750 (advancing such a position, and suggesting that the
Supreme Court may have adopted such an approach in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975),
a predecessor to Chaney which was distinguished in the latter decision).
146 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (citing ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987)).
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standard of review, it was unable or unwilling to consider a middle position
as a response to the problem it faced in Chaney. The reasoning of the BLE
Court in this regard has, however, been sharply criticized. 147 Indeed, the
Court's conclusion that reviewable issues cannot be "carved out" from
otherwise unreviewable decisions seems facially inconsistent with the language of the APA's exemption from judicial review, which states that
agency actions are exempt from review only "to the extent that... [they are]
committed to agency discretion by law."' 48 In light of these objections,
Ronald Levin has argued that the BLE decision should not be read so
broadly as to preclude doctrines of partial reviewability, and perhaps that is
the best response to BLE.49 Certainly a number of courts, including some
subsequent to the BLE decision, have recognized that questions of reviewability are not so easily separated from the choice of a standard of review.
When faced with claims that highly discretionary agency actions should be
immune from judicial review, these courts have responded by permitting
review, but adopting a highly deferential level of scrutiny to acknowledge
the agencies' legitimate claims to discretion. 150 This approach, which
seems both sensible and eminently pragmatic, could be very easily extended to review of nonenforcement decisions. And when combined with
the requirement that agencies state and follow consistent enforcement policies, such a system could limit many of the unfortunate consequences of
the Chaney doctrine without raising insurmountable practical difficulties.
One question that remains about the framework set forth above is
whether it is reasonable or feasible to require agencies to develop and promulgate formal statements of their enforcement policy prior to actual experience with violations, and then to subject these statements to judicial
review. Given the range of factual situations in which violations can arise,
the requirement of formulating a complete enforcement policy seems a
formidable burden. Moreover, Michael Asimow has explained that agencies' policies regarding enforcement priorities often develop informally, as
agency employees gain experience with different applications of governing
147 See Levin, supranote 5, at 723-24; see also id. at 705-06 (criticizing Court's general interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) as confusing reviewability with legality).
148 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (emphasis added). The legislative history of the APA, insofar as it bears

on this issue, also seems to reject the Court's view that discretionary agency decisions are entirely
immunized from judicial review. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATrVE
PROCEDURE Ar-LEGIs ATrvE HSTORY, 79th Cong., 1944-46, at 275 (1946) ("the existence of
discretion does not prevent a person from bringing a review action but merely prevents him pro
tanto from prevailing therein"); id. at 310-11 (Proceedings from the Congressional Record on
March 12, 1946: colloquy between Senators McCarran and Donnell in which Senator McCarran
agrees that the "mere fact that a statute may vest discretion in an agency" does not preclude
review); id. at 368-69 (Proceedings from the Congressional Record on May 24, 1946: statement of
Representative Walter).
149 See Levin, supra note 5, at 723-24. If true, this argument suggests that Judge Williams's
rejection in Crowey of the "legal issues" exception to Chaney may have been premature. See supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Connecticut Dept. of Children &Youth Servs. v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 9 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1993); International Union v. Dole, 869 F.2d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Cardozo v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542 (7th Cir. 1985). The
distinction drawn here between reviewability and the standard of review parallels Ronald Dworkin's distinction between two different views of discretion, one of which rests on a lack of control
by others, and another which rests on a lack of clear controlling standards. See Ronald Dworkin,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 14 (1967).
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rules, and only over time do they solidify into clearly articulable principles.' 5 ' If this is true-and there is every reason to think that it is-perhaps it is simply too much to ask agencies to state coherent enforcement
policies.
The answer, I think, is that most agencies are not novices in most areas
they regulate. Therefore, in most areas of agency authority enforcement
standards should be well developed, and if they are not, it is not unduly
burdensome to require that they be. Of course, there will be exceptionsnew areas of agency power, or areas where violations, or agency experience
with violations, are relatively rare. In such circumstances, reviewing courts
must be willing to make an exception so that agencies are permitted to
proceed more or less on a case-by-case basis, in formulating enforcement
policy. The requirement of a statement of reasons for declining enforcement, however, would continue to exist, 152 and judicial review would focus
on the rationality of the reasons given (with the appropriate degree of deference), as well as the consistency of the decision under review with previous agency actions and inactions. Such an approach would create strong
incentives to agencies to formulate general standards as quickly as practicable, since once an enforcement policy has been stated and judicially approved, review would be confined to consistency with that policy. But
agencies would retain the discretion to delay development of formal policies so long as it seems necessary. Similar reasoning also suggests that even
when an agency is not new to an area of regulation, agencies should have
broad flexibility to amend previously stated enforcement policies in light of
new circumstances or insights, and when an agency chooses to do so, reviewing courts should defer to this decision to the appropriate degree,
judging future enforcement and nonenforcement decisions against the
newly stated policy rather than placing agencies in a straitacket.' 53
What remain for consideration are the practical and procedural hurdles to review of nonenforcement decisions, and the related question of
whether permitting such review would create a deluge of litigation. Here,
however, I think that the difficulties identified by opponents of review are
vastly overstated. The procedural obstacles in particular, and the allegedly
related difficulty in identifying a "final agency action," 154 seem very minor.
It would be relatively easy to establish a petition procedure permitting private parties to seek an agency enforcement action, similar to the procedure
employed by the plaintiffs in Chany,5 5 and to procedures apparently currently in place in the NRC and NLRB.' 56 Combined with the requirement
151

Asimow, supra note 58, at 386 & n.28.

152

See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e); supranotes 128-32 and accompanying text.

153

It should be noted that the need for such flexibility argues sharply against imposing Notice

and Comment or other procedural requirements on the issuance of enforcement guidelines. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text.

154 See 5 U.S.C. § 704; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
155 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823.
156 Regarding the NRC's consideration of petitions to enforce, see Arnow v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1989); Safe Energy Coalition v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 866 F.2d 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988). Regarding the NLRJB's procedures, see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1975). Any number

1996]

THREE-BRANCH MONTE

that an agency explain its reasons for denying such a petition, 157 this procedure would generate both a relatively straightforward administrative mechanism to initiate review, and a clearly defined "final agency action" suitable
for review. Moreover, such a procedure appears to be contemplated, and
perhaps even required, by the provisions of the APA.15 8
A more substantial question is raised by the possibility that review of
nonenforcement decisions will lead to wasteful, or perhaps abusive, litigation. Again, however, the problems are far from insurmountable. First of
all, there is reason to doubt whether the number of persons who would
seek review of nonenforcement decisions is all that high, 59 so the whole
issue may be something of a chimera. But even if this were a potentially
serious concern, there are relatively simple mechanisms available within
current law to alleviate it. First of all, requirements of finality would prevent private parties from interfering with agency decisionmaking until the
agency had definitively decided whether or not to act. This constraint
might not reduce the number of challenges, but it will bring order to
them. A more substantial barrier is raised by the APA's limitation of review
to agency actions "for which there is no other adequate remedy available at
law."' 60 In the nonenforcement context this principle has been interpreted to limit the right of review to parties who lack any other avenue of
redress, including notably a private right of action against the alleged violator.' 6 ' If enforced strictly, this principle would sharply limit the number of
enforcement petitions agencies would be forced to entertain, and would
limit the right of review of agency inaction to those situations where it is
most needed. Similarly, existing judicial standing doctrines 162 would, for
better or worse, prevent the vast majority of the public from challenging
most nonenforcement decisions for lack of a particularized injury. In combination, these principles seem sufficient to shield agencies from any flood
of new litigation.
Finally, one must confront the possibility of abusive, as opposed to excessive, litigation. The concern here is that regulated entities would seek
to hinder the agency's enforcement efforts directed at them by challenging
an agency's failure to prosecute their competitors. It has, however, been
long established that an agency's failure to proceed against one's competitor is not a defense to an enforcement action directed at oneself, 63 and
there is no reason why permitting review of nonenforcement decisions
should change that rule. A regulated entity is welcome to petition the
agency to proceed against its competitors as well as itself, but it may not
of other agencies also entertain complaints filed by private parties regarding alleged regulatory
violations within their jurisdiction.
157 See supra note 128; 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994).

158 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (permitting a reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld"); id. at § 702 (authorizing review if agency officer "failed to act").
159 See Levin, supra note 5, at 764-65 & n.388.
160 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
161 See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1995); Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1986).
162 See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560-67 (1992); Allen v. Wright 468
U.S. 737 (1984).
163 See Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958).
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resist sanctions directed against itself on those grounds. As with all of the
limiting mechanisms set forth here, such a rule cannot prevent all abuse or
burden on the agency, but it should suffice to make the problems manageable. It must be borne in mind, after all, that in the search for manageable,
institutional mechanisms which characterizes administrative law, no solution is without its costs.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney represents perhaps
the most significant restriction placed on reviewability of administrative
agency decisions in many years. The Court's conclusion that agency decisions not to pursue enforcement actions should be presumptively unreviewable under the APA was based on a series of pragmatic considerations,
combined with a strong view of the appropriate roles of executive branch
discretion and judicial control in this area. Unfortunately, the underlying
tenets of the Chaney decision, and the doctrine that it has engendered, are
faulty; and as a consequence, Chaney has produced significant confusion in
the lower courts. The reaction of the lower courts in the decade since Chaney can fairly be characterized as a series of efforts to restrict the scope of
Chaney's presumption of unreviewability and to create principled exceptions to it whenever possible. All of these efforts, however, have ultimately
failed to accomplish their purpose, largely because the distinctions drawn
by the lower courts in seeking to constrain Chaney have proven as unmanageable as the distinctions drawn in Chaney itself.
The inability, or perhaps refusal, of the lower courts to come to terms
with Chaney might appear to be a mere judicial turf battle, but in fact that
does not seem the case. Rather, the lower courts' resistance reflects underlying problems with Chaney itself. The holding and opinion in Chaney rest
critically upon a distinction between an agency's use of its "executive
branch" enforcement powers on the one hand, and its use of legislative
and adjudicative powers on the other; but this distinction is ultimately unsustainable because it is theoretically incoherent within the administrative
context. First, administrative agencies generally lack the separation of powers which in the criminal context provides the justification for shielding
executive prosecutorial discretion from judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, elementary legal realist analysis reveals that agencies are able to make rules
and formulate substantive policies through enforcement policy in much
the same manner as through rulemaking or adjudications. When a single
agency possesses all three types of governmental power, therefore, it is
often able to employ them interchangeably. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to even tell which power an agency is exercising at a particular time.
As a consequence, a legal rule which makes the important question of reviewability turn on such an insubstantial distinction seems likely to engender confusion, and seems also an invitation to abuse, as agencies
manipulate the types of action through which they implement their objectives in order to avoid judicial review of substantive rules and policies.
All of these problems, and the inability of the lower courts to address
them adequately, argue strongly in favor of recognizing a right of review of
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agency nonenforcement decisions. On the other hand, pragmatic concerns about the ability and capacity of courts to supervise multi-factored
decisions regarding allocation of resources and establishment of priorities
suggests that the right of review must be a limited one. I argue that a balance can be found in a system of modulated review, which rests heavily on a
dual requirement that an agency state reasons for failing to pursue an enforcement action, and develop coherent guidelines and policies to control
future exercises of enforcement discretion. If, however, an agency formulates and consistently follows a particular enforcement policy, courts
should be extremely deferential in reviewing the discretionary aspects of
that policy regarding such matters as limited resources, as well as in reviewing the application of such discretionary factors to particular enforcement
decisions. Where a policy or decision rests on more substantive or legal
judgments, however, the courts should engage in more searching review.
Such a system of review, along with some procedural innovations and some
limitations, is well suited to alleviate the worst concerns raised by the Chaney doctrine and still avoid the costs of limiting agency flexibility that a
right of review might otherwise produce.

